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This article was presented as a lecture at the Australasian Law Teachers' Association 
Conference held at Victoria University of Wellington, 6 July 1999. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Ensuring access to justice is one of the most basic functions of the State.  Most of our 
legal rules are concerned with doing justice according to law to parties before the courts.  
But access to justice is concerned with how the State ensures that fair, efficient and 
expeditious dispute resolution can be achieved.  It is access to justice that will be the broad 
theme of this paper.   
As a preliminary comment, I suggest there are four relevant features of the justice 
system in a democracy.  First, the orderly resolution of disputes is essential to the 
functioning of any democratic society.  The law should be the means through which 
people can protect their rights and interests, and through which the community can be 
confident that disputes will be settled.  The second feature of justice in a democracy is that 
the institutions of government are under the law.  Parliament and the Executive are bound 
by the law just like every other person and body in New Zealand.  The third feature is that 
the courts as the judicial branch of government have a particular role in the protection of 
human rights.  And the fourth feature of justice in a democracy is that the equal protection 
of the law and the due process of the law underpin the resolution of disputes between 
citizen and citizen, and citizen and the State.  That is fundamental to the functioning of 
democracy.  
To a large extent any system of justice reflects the values of the particular society.  
Democracies such as ours place a high value on the equality and individuality of all its 
members.  A balancing consideration to individual rights is the interests of the community.  
That weighing requires fine-tuning.  The goal must be to provide a proper balance 
between the rights and obligations of individuals; balanced against the rights and 
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obligations of minority groups, including different generations, and particularly 
indigenous and ethnic minorities; and balanced against the rights and obligations of the 
community as a whole.   
Within the broad theme of access to justice, and to focus on how rights must be 
balanced, I would like to address a number of topics.  The title for this conference invites 
speakers to consider legal developments made over the course of the past one hundred 
years.  I will not be quite so ambitious in my scope.  In each area I will consider changes 
and advances that have been made in recent years and look ahead also to the future.   
First, I propose to discuss the role and functioning of the Court of Appeal.  One usually 
associates the term "access to justice" with the right to access trial courts, but the ability to 
access appellate courts may be equally important.  And of course it is the area that I am 
best placed to comment on.  I am concerned to examine how the Court of Appeal can 
balance its undoubted function as a developer of the law with its dispute resolution 
function; in other words, its function as a fair and efficient provider of justice to the parties 
appearing before it. 
Second, I want to comment on the operation of the legal aid system in New Zealand.  
In its interim report on the Bill of Rights White Paper, the Justice and Law Reform Select 
Committee commented that unless the Bill of Rights provided some guarantees of 
assistance in gaining access to the courts, it would be "irrelevant to the mass of people 
within this society who do not enjoy the 'right of access to justice' at the present time".1  I 
will consider the current system as governed by the Legal Services Act 1991 and ask some 
questions about the level of assistance that must be provided "in the interests of justice". 
Third, I will consider the extent to which the operations of the court system should be 
open to the public.  The principle of open administration of justice is an important one and 
has been reaffirmed in countless decisions.  But how far should that principle of openness 
extend in the television age?  I will look at how that issue has been addressed in New 
Zealand. 
II THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
Turning first to the role of the Court of Appeal.  An appellate court is said to have three 
functions.  First, an appeal court is able to correct errors made in the lower courts.  This 
function is directly concerned with doing justice to litigants as it ensures that the 
determination of their rights in the court below was made upon a correct understanding of 
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the law. Second, an appeal court supervises the functioning of trial courts.  The availability 
of appeal to a single court ensures a consistency of approach towards the administration of 
justice throughout the country.  Third, an appeal court enunciates and harmonises the law.  
There can be no doubt that it is a proper function of the courts to make law, whether it is 
through the interpretation of statutes or development of the common law.  In fulfilling this 
role the court is less concerned with the parties before it, although they benefit from 
having the law correctly determined, than it is with the broader development of our law.   
I venture to say that the competing demands of the dispute resolution function and the 
law-making one are more pressing on the New Zealand Court of Appeal than on similar 
courts in most other jurisdictions.  Let me explain.   
The first point is the sheer volume of cases dealt with by the Court of Appeal.  We have 
very little ability to control the flow of cases reaching us because in the vast majority of 
cases appeals are as of right rather than by leave.  This means that the number of cases we 
must hear is far greater than in final courts elsewhere.  In 1997, the Court of Appeal 
determined 513 criminal appeals and 160 civil appeals.  This number, which excludes a 
large number of miscellaneous motions, was slightly fewer than in 1996 and slightly more 
than in 1998.  These figures represent a substantial increase from earlier times.  Twenty-
five years ago in 1983, the Court dealt with 263 criminal appeals and 109 civil appeals, and 
25 years before that the totals were 51 and 35 respectively.  In his report on appeals to the 
Privy Council, the Solicitor-General noted that in the period between 1987 and 1994 the 
Court's workload increased by 60 per cent.2  The Court has responded to this increase, 
referred to in the United States as "the crisis of volume", with more active case 
management techniques, which I will discuss in a moment, and an increased use of 
divisional courts, particularly the criminal appeal division which now hears the majority 
of criminal appeals.   
The number of cases reaching the Court of Appeal contrasts markedly with the figures 
in other countries.  In 1997, the High Court of Australia (which has seven judges) gave 56 
judgments, 49 being delivered by the full court and seven by single justices; the Supreme 
Court of Canada (with nine judges) delivered 107 judgments; the House of Lords  (which 
has 12 full time Law Lords) gave 54; and the Supreme Court of the United States (with 
nine justices) delivered 90 judgments in its October 1996 to October 1997 term.   
New Zealand judges also function with less in the way of assistance than their 
counterparts in other jurisdictions.  We now, after considerable struggle, each have a 
judge's clerk to assist with research but this compares with two clerks per judge in the 
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High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of Canada and three to four clerks per 
judge in United States Federal Courts of Appeal.  In the United States Supreme Court each 
of the sitting Justices has four clerks except for Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
who have three. 
The second point is that the Court is carrying out two quite different functions.  This is 
reflected in the allocation of cases to three and five judge courts.  The great bulk of three 
judge cases are of immediate importance to the parties but they ordinarily have no wider 
impact on the continuing development of the law.  In these cases the Court's primary 
function is to review the decision below and correct error.  Where, however, a case raises 
issues of importance, including any legal, social and general economic considerations; or if 
there are conflicting decisions of lower courts; or if the Court is to be asked to depart from 
its own earlier decision, then it should be heard by a court comprising five or seven judges.  
Our Court of Appeal really functions both as a busy intermediate appellate court – with 
three judges assigned to hear cases – and also for practical purposes as a final tier of 
appeal – with five or seven judges sitting.  We hear approximately 60 cases per year in the 
latter capacity, a number comparable with final courts in other jurisdictions. 
The third point is that although the Court of Appeal is strictly speaking an 
intermediate court, as suggested a moment ago, it serves for most intents and purposes as 
a final appeal court.  In 1997, the Privy Council determined 14 appeals from New Zealand.  
In 1996, it was only nine and last year it was just seven.  In the past three years there have 
been only seven successful Privy Council appeals and during this period there have been 
just two successful appeals where the case was heard by a full court of five judges in New 
Zealand.  In one of those cases the appeal was allowed on a ground not invoked as a basis 
for granting leave to appeal and in the other, a rare criminal appeal, the Privy Council held 
by three to two that it was not certain that the appellant would have been convicted in the 
absence of an irregularity at trial.  
The low number of cases proceeding to London is not, I should point out, due to a 
restrictive approach towards the granting of leave.  In 1997, only 13 leave applications 
were heard.  Nor are Court of Appeal decisions frequently reviewed by way of leave 
applications to the Judicial Committee itself.  This contrasts with the situation in, for 
example, the United States where, although very few appeals are heard in the Supreme 
Court from the decisions of state supreme courts and federal appeals courts, the Supreme 
Court does deal with a very large number of applications for leave, as I mentioned, as 
many as 7000 per year. 
These figures demonstrate that the Court of Appeal serves a very real dispute 
resolution role for a large number of litigants.  And yet the Court must also make final 
decisions on the development of the law in the vast majority of cases.  Given that the 
parties before the Court are there to have their dispute resolved it is important that the 
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Court deliver judgment expeditiously.  An effective remedy is a timely one.  A number of 
reports in recent years, including the Woolf report in 1996,3 have stressed that efficiency 
and speed are important features of the right of access to justice.   
This has been recognised in the Court of Appeal with the adoption of more active case 
management in recent years.  Proactive caseflow management allows for the monitoring of 
appeals.  For example, criminal appeals involving child complainants, pre-trial rulings, 
short sentences and bail matters are segregated out and given special priority.  Active case 
management allows for the organising of uneven workflows and faster turn-around times 
avoid backlogs and facilitate timetabling.  Most cases are disposed of within one month of 
the hearing and last year there were only a handful of judgments outstanding at the end of 
the year. 
The system also remains sufficiently flexible to allow schedules to be altered to deal 
with urgent appeals.  A striking example concerned the decision on behalf of Northland 
Health Limited not to provide or continue to provide dialysis for a sick patient.  The High 
Court delivered its decision in Whangerei on the morning of 10 October 1997, the appeal 
papers were lodged early in the afternoon, we began hearing shortly after 5 o'clock, heard 
extensive submissions from counsel, and announced the decision dismissing the appeal 
shortly before midnight.  Again, in 1999 we had to deal with two urgent last minute 
applications arising out of electricity reforms due to be finalised on 31 March and 1 April 
1999.  One we squeezed in on 30 March and gave judgment the next day.  In the second, 
the High Court injunction was granted on 31 March, counsel came to the Court of Appeal 
at 4 o'clock that day and met with the judges in chambers and a hearing was set down for 
11 o'clock the next morning.  Having read the papers late into the night before, when Colin 
Carruthers QC, who also appeared in the just mentioned Northland Health case, told us at 
11 o'clock that agreement had been reached I half expected him to add "April Fool". 
Case management requires an acknowledgement that no litigant should have an open 
ended right to be heard.  In Ashmore v Corporation of Lloyd's Lord Roskill commented that 
"[l]itigants are only entitled to so much of the trial judge's time as is necessary for the 
proper determination of the relevant issues".4  And in 1992 the present Chief Justice of 
Australia Sir Murray Gleeson said that "[m]ost judges nowadays accept a responsibility, 
not merely towards the particular litigants who are currently before them, but also to the 
others who are waiting in the queue".5 
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The third consideration that I noted in my introduction is that the system of justice 
must serve both the legitimate interests of the parties and the wider public interest in the 
administration of justice.  Litigation is not a private preserve of those immediately 
involved.  The open, fair and effective functioning of the courts is fundamental to a 
democratic society.  The performance of the judicial system influences economic decision 
making, social harmony, individual flourishing and community development.  That 
crucial public interest in the justice system is a critical consideration in numerous justice 
questions.    
None of this means that efficiency should be allowed to override quality and the need 
for careful deliberation.  But case management is not focussed on reducing the amount of 
time judges spend actually writing and discussing any particular decision.  Rather it is 
about ensuring that time is available to be spent on the case relatively promptly after it is 
heard.  It is also important to ensure that the hearing time is well spent.  When sitting on 
criminal cases we hear an average of two appeals per day.  Civil cases take longer: the vast 
majority are heard in one day and a very few are heard over two or more days.  In recent 
years the court has reduced the hearing times to this length through active case 
management.  Hearing times are allocated in advance with input from counsel.  
Submissions, which follow a set format and are subject to a maximum length, are filed in 
advance and are read by the judges.  By following these procedures we are able to move 
straight to the relevant issues on the day of the hearing. 
Just as in the health system efficiency may be increased by reducing inpatient times, in 
the justice system the length of time people spend in that system is a factor in the efficient 
operation of the courts.  Here I note that in recent years, according to one survey, the 
average length of a jury trial has increased by 40 per cent: a study of why this has occurred 
would be the first step in determining whether there is any scope for reduction. 
Turning for a moment to cases dealing with the nature of disputes that may properly 
come before the courts, it should be pointed out that many issues in this area are far from 
settled.  Two important cases in the Court of Appeal late last year concerned to some 
extent the right to access the courts.  First, in Peters v Davison,6 the Winebox case, Mr Peters 
argued successfully for the right to challenge certain findings of a commission of inquiry.  
Only such a court challenge, it was argued, could serve to remedy alleged slurs made on 
Mr Peters' reputation in alleged error of law.  The judgments in Peters v Davison stressed 
the principles that the courts have final responsibility for determining the law and that 
access to such determinations is not lightly to be denied.  Second, in Choudry v Attorney-
General,7 the plaintiff argued for his right to access documents held by the New Zealand 
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Security Intelligence Service.  Without these documents, it was said, the plaintiff could not 
pursue his civil claim against the service for what might be called "home invasion" and 
thereby obtain a meaningful remedy for an alleged violation of his rights.  If all attempts to 
access relevant documents are unhesitatingly rebuffed by the claim of national security 
then there is no genuine possibility of access to justice.  The judgment in that case 
emphasised that it is the final responsibility of the courts to balance fair trial rights against 
confidentiality concerns to determine where the interests of justice lie. 
As well as access to the courts and expeditious hearings, it is also desirable that 
litigants and those coming after them have some certainty of result.  A comparison 
between our Court of Appeal, the High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of 
Canada reveals that currently our Court has far fewer dissents and significant differences 
of reasoning.  There is of course a place for dissenting judgments, and a persuasive dissent 
today may well become the law some time in the future.  But in general it is desirable to 
achieve certainty.  Certainty is what the public expects from its judges.   
It is interesting to contrast the reception of two very important recent cases.  The first 
case I am thinking of is the House of Lords' judgment in Pinochet.8  Shortly after the ruling, 
The Economist commented that the "Law Lords have now written seven separate 
judgments, all of which disagree with the others on major points of law".9  The ruling, the 
newspaper said, is so "confusing that it is unlikely to be followed by courts anywhere but 
in Britain, and even British courts will have difficulty deciphering what it means."  
Although I do not endorse those comments I think that it shows that the public's 
expectation of clarity went unfulfilled.  Contrast this with the Supreme Court of Canada's 
judgment in Reference Re Secession of Quebec.10  This judgment last year was billed as the 
most important ever decided by the Supreme Court.  The Canadian Government, by way 
of Order in Council, asked the Court to consider whether or not the Province of Quebec 
has the right to secede unilaterally from the rest of Canada.  Notwithstanding the diversity 
of the Supreme Court bench, a single judgment of the court, signed by all nine justices, was 
delivered.  The balanced compromise presented by the Supreme Court was well received 
in both the English and French press. 
III THE LEGAL AID SYSTEM 
The ability to access justice depends not only on the operation of the courts, but also on 
the ability to be represented before them.  With that in mind I turn now to consider the 
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legal aid system.  The right to appear before a court may be of little value in the absence of 
effective representation.  It would be a poor reflection on the legal profession if it were 
ever to be suggested that a litigant in person is in as good a position to obtain justice as one 
represented by counsel.  The right to be legally represented is of the most pressing 
importance to those facing criminal charges.  This is recognised in section 24(f) of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 which provides that persons charged: "Shall have the right 
to receive legal assistance without cost if the interests of justice so require and the person 
does not have sufficient means to provide for that assistance".   
The section raises the question of what the interests of justice require.  In particular, 
when do the interests of justice require an appeal and legal assistance to pursue that 
appeal?  Can it be said that so long as there is a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal, and 
in most cases there is, then that right should be open to all?  Should there be a right to 
receive state assistance to pursue an appeal, no matter how tenuous its legal basis?  And if 
there is the right to receive assistance for one appeal, why not for a further appeal? 
The inevitable link between socio-economic conditions and crime means that a great 
many persons coming before the courts on criminal charges do not have the means to pay 
for representation.  In a survey of prison inmates and periodic detainees conducted in 
1995, 100 per cent of respondents had at some time applied for and received criminal legal 
aid.11  When asked what they would do if refused legal aid for an appeal, 30 per cent 
responded that they would still try to get a lawyer, 25 per cent said that they would simply 
drop the appeal, with 39 per cent replying that they would handle it themselves.  
Here I interpolate that refusing legal aid in circumstances where the appeal will 
proceed without it, is something of a false economy.  Litigants in person consume an 
exaggerated amount of judicial time and resources. 
As in the lower courts, criminal legal aid is available in the Court of Appeal if it is 
desirable in the interests of justice.  The decision as to whether or not this is so is made by 
the Registrar in consultation with a Judge of the Court of Appeal.  The system that the 
Court of Appeal has adopted to deal with legal aid applications was the subject of 
extensive analysis in Nicholls v Registrar of the Court of Appeal,12 but suffice to say that 
applications are considered by three judges and their views are made known to the 
Registrar before the final decision is made.  Where legal aid is refused the applicant may 
apply for a review and this is considered by a fourth judge.  In deciding whether or not to 
recommend that the Registrar grant legal aid the principal consideration is whether there 
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is an arguable ground of appeal, that is that the appeal has an argument that could 
succeed.  The gravity of the offence and all other surrounding circumstances are also taken 
into account. 
The legal aid system in the Court of Appeal is thought by many to be highly 
unsatisfactory.  In Nicholls v Registrar of the Court of Appeal Tipping J commented:13 
I respectfully question whether the Judges of what is effectively, for almost all cases, New 
Zealand's final Court of Appeal, should be considering, for legal aid purposes, the viability of 
an argument, for example, that there is not enough evidence to support a conviction for 
burglary, possession of cannabis for supply, or even a more serious crime.  Even with the 
assistance (criticised though it was) of the clerks, the Judges (potentially four of them) each 
have to consider the matter, often in some detail. 
As for the Privy Council, although a right to appeal still exists in certain circumstances, 
legal aid is available in respect of those appeals only if the Minister of Justice or Attorney-
General agrees.  
It is important that we think carefully as a society about the level of access to justice 
that people should be entitled to bearing in mind that resources are necessarily limited.  
Access to justice cannot require that the State ensures unlimited provision of legal services 
to everyone in every situation on a demand driven basis.  That would unfairly divert 
resources away from other areas.  As earlier noted, a consideration is that the 
administration of justice involves the use and so the allocation of necessarily limited 
resources.  The criticism is often made that the courts provide a Rolls Royce system and 
that the only people who can indulge in litigation, apart from those who have to, are the 
rich and the legally aided.  Justice may be priceless.  But it is not costless.  The acceptable 
resolution of disputes involves balancing human rights and other moral values, fairness 
considerations and resource constraints.  My point is that proposals to limit legal aid 
cannot be dismissed out of hand as contrary to justice.  Other public policy considerations 
involving competing claims on limited resources require a choice at the margin between 
expenditure on health, education, justice, social welfare, defence and so on.  Just as in the 
decisions we make as individuals as to how we will spend our energies and our money, 
there are always policy trade-offs between efficiency, fairness and other individual and 
community values. 
IV MEDIA COVERAGE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS 
I turn now to discuss access to the courts by non-participants via the media.  The 
televising of court proceedings has recently been the subject of a three-year pilot study in 
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New Zealand.  The study was instituted to develop and test rules to govern television 
access and arose from a report of a working party of the Courts Consultative Committee.   
In its report the working party considered arguments both for and against allowing 
courtroom proceedings to be televised.  The strongest argument in favour is that through 
television, public access to the operation of the courts can be enhanced.  Public perceptions 
of the integrity and performance of the justice system are crucial to maintaining respect for 
the rule of law and the role of the courts in a healthy democracy.  Few members of the 
public have the time, resources or inclination to physically attend court sittings.  The 
community that the courts exist to serve consists also of those who rely on media reporting 
for information on the justice system.   
A second argument is that the televising of proceedings can help to ensure that the 
courts are operating fairly and efficiently.  A bill introduced into the United States House 
of Representatives on the subject of televised court proceedings was actually called the 
"Sunshine in the Courtroom Act", an apparent reference to Louis Brandeis' remark that 
"sunshine is the best disinfectant" for ill-doings.  The argument is similar to that made for 
the televising of Parliamentary and Select Committee proceedings: let the public see just 
what the actors in their system of government are up to. 
Third, television can help educate the public about the court system.  My impression is 
that the general public does not have a good understanding of how the New Zealand 
justice system operates.  Indeed, the popularity of the new wave of courtroom dramas, 
such as "The Practice", probably means that New Zealanders have a greater familiarity 
with American courtroom procedure, to the extent that it is fairly represented in such 
programmes, than they do their own.  
There does appear to be a desire on the part of the public to know more about the 
courts.  Between two surveys conducted in 1996 and 1997 the percentage of people 
opposed to broadcasts from within the courtroom fell from 58 per cent to 35 per cent.  And 
positive support for such broadcasting rose from 25 per cent to 39 per cent.  Whilst 
cameras will probably never enter our courtrooms to the extent that they have in the 
United States, which has an entire commercial channel called Court TV, there is the 
potential for more.   
There are, however, a number of well-founded fears about what greater televising 
might do.  First is the effect that it may have on trial participants.  Judges may be 
distracted, lawyers may grandstand, and witnesses and jurors may fear the loss of privacy.  
The pilot study has allayed many fears that cameras would be disruptive, but the privacy 
argument is an important one.  As always the rights to free expression and freedom of the 
media must be balanced against privacy values.   
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Second, there is the risk that important matters will be trivialised and that through 
editing, serious proceedings will be reduced to resemble "You Be The Judge", the tabloid-
style disputes programme.  The reality of courtroom proceedings is that they are slow and 
deliberative.  Given that television is principally an entertainment medium rather than an 
educational one, editors will have every incentive to show only the most sensational 
moments.  This will give the public an unrealistic view of how the courts operate.   
Third, there is a risk of unfair prejudice to accused persons, particularly if they are later 
acquitted.  Although such prejudice may occur simply as a result of the trial itself, 
television extends its reach.   
A set of rules on television coverage of court proceedings, derived from 
recommendations of the Courts Consultative Committee and designed to address the 
concerns mentioned above whilst expanding media coverage of the courts, has recently 
been agreed upon by High Court and District Court judges.   
The former Chief Justice said that in formulating the rules "the judiciary has balanced 
the principles of open justice with the accused's right to a fair trial.  The purpose of a set of 
rules and code of conduct is to ensure that, where expanded coverage is permitted, those 
principles are upheld."  The rules begin with a presumption in favour of access but 
provide safeguards.  For example one rule requires accurate, impartial and balanced 
coverage of proceedings and parties involved in unedited broadcasts of at least two 
minutes duration.  Family Court and mental health hearings are excluded from the 
expanded coverage and any witness or party in civil proceedings who objects to being 
identified shall have the matter determined by a judge.  A more detailed code of conduct 
relating to the coverage of courtroom proceedings will be developed in consultation with 
the media.  With the co-operation of the media and within the framework of rules agreed 
upon by the judges it is expected that the public will be afforded greater opportunities to 
witness the workings of its justice system, without undue prejudice to the participants. 
V  CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this address I suggested that the justice system should reflect the 
values of our society.  The goal must be to provide a proper balance between individual 
rights and the rights of various groups and more broadly the rights, interests and 
obligations of the community as a whole.  The purpose of this paper has been to illustrate 
how this balance is currently struck in three areas: the functioning of the Court of Appeal, 
the operation of the legal aid system, and the televising of courtroom proceedings.  What is 
thought desirable in all three of these areas will undoubtedly change over time and there 
will always be the need for fine-tuning.  Forums such as this provide a valuable 
opportunity for debate and reflection on how the justice system can best meet the 
expectations of the community.  
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